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ORIGINAL THINKING
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26 Oct 2026
BY Pippa Reyburn , Yana van Leeve AND Tsukudu Moroeng

When a contract is not just a contract: Constitutional Court’s judgment in Brain Gear

When a municipality signs a contract, does it step out of its public role and act like any other business? Or does it bring its public responsibilities to the table? This question has real consequences for companies that do business with the state, and the Constitutional Court has recently provided a useful answer.

On 9 October 2026, the Constitutional Court (“CC”) delivered judgment in Brain Gear Investments (Pty) Ltd v Buhle Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others; Sembcorp Silulumanzi (RF) (Pty) Ltd and Others v Buhle Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others; Sembcorp Utilities (Netherlands) NV v Buhle Waste (Pty) Ltd and Others (“Brain Gear”). At its heart, the case was about a single decision: the Municipal Manager of the City of Mbombela Municipality (“Municipality”) confirmed that Sembcorp Silulumanzi (RF) (Pty) Ltd (“Silulumanzi”) had met a condition that the Municipal Council (“Council”) had attached to the Municipality’s consent. That confirmation made the consent unconditional. The judgment raises important questions about the nature of decisions that municipalities take under contracts to which they are party, and the legal rules that govern those decisions.

Background: a water concession, a share sale and a BEE partner

Following a public procurement process, the Municipality and Silulumanzi concluded a 30-year concession agreement in terms of which Silulumanzi would supply water to certain parts of the Municipality. The Sembcorp Group later sought to dispose of its interests in South Africa. Pursuant to that, Sembcorp Utilities (Netherlands) NV (“SUN”) and SUN’s wholly owned subsidiary, Sembcorp Utilities South Africa (Pty) Ltd (“SUSA”), agreed to sell 100% of their shares in Silulumanzi to South African Water Works (Pty) Ltd (“SAWW”). Given that this would result in a change of control of Silulumanzi, Silulumanzi was required to obtain the Municipality’s consent to the transfer of SUSA’s shareholding to SAWW.

The Municipality, by way of a Council resolution, granted this consent on condition that SAWW identify a local black economic empowerment (“BEE”) entity to purchase at least 28% of the shares in Silulumanzi from SAWW. The Council resolution further set terms for the participation of municipal officials in the process that SAWW would undertake to identify a local BEE entity. The Municipal Manager was made responsible for confirming that the condition had been fulfilled. Such confirmation would have the effect of rendering the Municipality’s consent to the change of control of Silulumanzi unconditional.

Brain Gear Investments (Pty) Ltd (“BGI”), Buhle Waste (Pty) Ltd (“Buhle”) and others participated in the process conducted by SAWW. BGI obtained the most points, and SAWW selected BGI as its local BEE partner. Buhle was unsuccessful. The Municipal Manager confirmed the fulfilment of the condition, and SUN, SUSA, SAWW, Silulumanzi and BGI then concluded the sale of shares agreements.

From the High Court to the Constitutional Court

Aggrieved, Buhle brought a review application in the High Court of South Africa, Mpumalanga Division, Mbombela (“High Court”), challenging the Municipality’s decision under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (“PAJA”) or, alternatively, the principle of legality, on numerous grounds. Buhle’s primary complaint was that the Municipality did not exercise sufficient oversight over Silulumanzi and SAWW’s process which resulted in the selection of BGI, and that the confirmation given by the Municipal Manager therefore violated the principles of administrative justice and should be reviewed and set aside. Due to what it regarded as irregularities in the process, the High Court agreed with Buhle and reviewed and set aside the decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court of Appeal (“SCA”) upheld the High Court’s decision. BGI, Silulumanzi and SUN brought separate applications for leave to appeal against the SCA’s judgment to the Constitutional Court.

Constitutional Court judgment

The CC held that the requirement to seek the Municipality’s consent arose from a negotiated term of the concession agreement. Accordingly, when the Council passed a resolution granting consent, it was not exercising a power “in terms of legislation”. Rather, it was exercising a contractual power arising from the concession agreement. Further, it was the Municipal Manager’s confirmation of compliance with the condition that was the operative decision bringing the Municipality’s consent into effect. Even this confirmation, the CC held, was not an exercise of power in terms of legislation: it was a further degree removed from the Municipality’s conclusion of the concession agreement, arising from a contractual power exercised by the Municipality and exercised by the Municipal Manager under a power delegated by the Municipality. The CC accordingly found that the decision did not constitute administrative action and was not reviewable under PAJA. Put simply, PAJA was the wrong tool for the job.

That was not the end of the matter. The CC went on to hold that both the Council resolution and the Municipal Manager’s confirmation giving effect to it constituted the exercise of public power and were reviewable under the principle of legality, a broader constitutional requirement that all exercises of public power must be lawful and rational. The CC gave the following reasons:

  • Firstly, the decisions were made pursuant to a contract concluded following a public procurement process.
  • Secondly, the statutory nature of the Municipality indicated that it was exercising public power.
  • Thirdly, the concession agreement involved the performance of a critical public function (water supply).
  • Fourthly, the consent clause was included for a public purpose, namely, to ensure that the concessionaire would be known to the Municipality as an entity that could properly and reliably supply water.
  • Lastly, the Municipality exercised a degree of superiority when it was asked for its consent. Finally, by requiring SAWW to contract with a local BEE entity, the Municipality sought to secure an economic benefit for the Municipality and to meet transformation objectives.

In a twist, however, Buhle did not benefit from this finding that the Municipality must act in accordance with the principle of legality. The CC held that Buhle’s delay in bringing its review application in the High Court was unreasonable and should not be overlooked. Buhle’s review application should therefore have been dismissed, and it was not necessary to determine whether the Municipality’s decisions were lawful. The lesson for would-be litigants is clear: even a sound challenge can fail if it is brought too late.

Analysis: where private contracts meet public law

From a constitutional and administrative law perspective, the judgment is a useful example of when a decision made by an organ of state in a commercial context will be subject to the principle of legality, even if it does not constitute “administrative action” under PAJA. It is tempting to assume that no public law principles apply when a municipality takes decisions under a privately negotiated contract. Brain Gear shows that this assumption is risky: the Council resolution, and the Municipal Manager’s confirmation giving effect to it, were subject to the principle of legality because they constituted an exercise of public power. One could go further. Because an organ of state can never be taken to be acting in its own interest, it could be argued that any decision made by an organ of state pursuant to a contract to which it is a party will be subject to the principle of legality, having been done in the public interest and for public purposes. That said, no hard rules can be drawn about when the principle of legality will apply. Each case will turn on its own facts, taking into account the factors identified by the CC in judgments such as Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union and Others v Chamber of Mines of South Africa and Others at paras 74-75.

What this means in practice

The upshot of the judgment is that decisions of a municipal council, and decisions taken by a municipal manager under a delegated power, will likely be subject to judicial review, even where those powers arise from a contract. For organs of state, this means continuing to assess their decisions against the principles of legality, rationality and fairness, even when acting under a commercial agreement. For private entities, the message is equally important: while contract terms are generally governed by private law, when the state is a contracting party there is a high likelihood that public law principles will apply to the decisions it makes in exercising its contractual rights or duties. Those who wish to challenge such decisions should also act promptly, as Brain Gear shows that delay can be fatal. In short, when the state signs a contract, it does not leave its public responsibilities at the door.

Pippa Reyburn

Head of Department | Public Law

preyburn@ENSafrica.com

Yana van Leeve

Executive | Public Law

yvanleeve@ENSafrica.com

Tsukudu Moroeng

Associate | Public Law

tmoroeng@ensafrica.com